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FLUCTUATING SHORELINES AND TIDAL
BOUNDARIES: AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM
Problems arising from disputed boundaries between adjacent
land owners are of real importance to the practicing attorney.
These problems are no less significant, and a good deal more
complicated, when they involve tidal boundaries between upland
and tideland ownership. To the layman who owns or purchases
beachfront property, one of the main concerns is that his land
extends to the water's edge, and he probably expects that such is
the case. But when the description in the deed describes the
boundary as the ordinary high-water mark, does he really know
how much he owns or where his boundary line actually is? Does
he know how that will be determined? When coupled with the
fact that the "mapping of the . . . tidal boundary between
private property and state-owned 'tide lands,' is becoming
increasingly important to our coastal states as property values
increase,"' and considering that "[o]ur country has about 90,000
miles of tidal shoreline and the shore boundaries of all the
properties along that shoreline are tidal boundaries, ' 2 significant
problems are presented. The totality of these factors can only
escalate the desire for meaningful and understandable answers to
the questions the landowner may ask his attorney. The case of
People v. William Kent Estate Company is illustrative of the
difficulties involved in answering these questions.
The William Kent Estate Company is the legal owner of
certain beachfront property located in northern California on a
I. Karo, Establishment of Tidal Datums, SHORE AND BEACH, April 1965, at 27
[hereinafter cited as Karo]. Admiral Karo was the director of the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey at the time this article was written.
2. Tison, Tidal Datums and Tidal Boundaries, SHORE AND BEACH, October 1965, at 7
[hereinafter cited as Tison]. Admiral Tison was the director of the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey when this article was prepared.
In the measurement of the shoreline of the United States in 1939-1940, the Coast
and Geodetic Survey arrived at the total of 88,633 statute miles. The coastline of
California alone measures 3,427 statute miles. 2 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA
BOUNDARIES 483 (Coast and Geodetic Survey Pub. No. 10-1, 1964) [hereinafter cited as 2
SHALOWITZ].
3. 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kent].
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sandspit separating the Bolinas Lagoon from the Pacific Ocean.
The property is bounded on the east by the lagoon and on the
west by the ocean. In 1950, the company brought a quiet title
action to determine the exact location of the waterfront
boundaries. Following a state survey, a decree was entered fixing
the lagoon boundary at "the 'low water mark in Bolinas
Lagoon, as fixed by the . . . State survey.' "I The decree
described the ocean boundary as " 'the ordinary high-water
mark on the shore of the Pacific Ocean,' and thence along the
shore by courses and distances, ' 5 with no reference to the state
survey.
Due to seasonal changes in the weather and ocean currents,
each year sand is deposited on the beach during the summer
months, resulting in an increase in the beach area, while in the
winter months, sand is eroded from the beach, thus decreasing
the beach area. As a result of these yearly fluctuations, the
actual high tide line moves in and out as the beach itself moves
in and out. During the summer months, the company, the upland
owner, finds itself with a beach approximately eighty feet wider
than during the winter months.' (See Fig. 1.)
UPLAND
HORIZONTAL COMPONENTS--/ AY
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Figure I. Tidal datums and the migrating beach in Kent. Not to scale.
- Position of the beach during summer.
- - -. Position of the beach during winter.
A and A'-Respective ordinary high water marks.
B and B'- Respective ordinary low water marks.
I, 2, and 3-Vertical components.
4. Id. at 159, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 217. For the purposes of this discussion, the lagoon
boundary is not in issue.
5. Id. at 159, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
6. The extent to which the beach actually does "grow" or "shrink" was and is an
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The company, wishing to make full and complete use of its
land, without interference, claimed ownership of the beach
property to the ordinary high-water mark as it exists during the
summer months when the beach is at its maximum width, and
built a fence to that point bearing a "no trespassing" sign.
During the winter, however, as the beach erodes shoreward, some
portion of the fence is located seaward of the then-existing high
tide line. The State brought an action against the company "to
enjoin the defendant from asserting ownership to and excluding
the public from areas periodically covered by the tidal waters of
the Pacific Ocean and claimed to be sovereign lands of this
State,"' and to otherwise protect its public trust.
The trial court gave judgment for the State and "enjoined
defendant from interfering with the public use of the land lying
'seaward of the ordinary high water mark.' "I It refused- to
accept defendant's argument that the 1950 survey and the
subsequent decree had established a fixed boundary line, but
ruled that the boundary was " 'the ordinary high water mark of
the Pacific Ocean as it may fluctuate naturally from time to
time.' "I It also found that due to natural erosion and accretion,
the ordinary high-water mark shifts seaward and landward.
On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The court disagreed with the findings that the ordinary
high-water mark fluctuated as the beach changed, and that
accretion and erosion had occurred. Additionally, the court held
that the trial court had mistakenly applied the federal standard
rather than the state standard in computing the height of
ordinary high water. In order to fix the boundary between the
upland and the tideland, the parties should determine the average
line of the shore throughout the year, taking into consideration
the seasonal movement of sand.
issue upon which the parties are not agreed, and remains to be determined. But as the
district court noted: "This movement of the sand can account for variations of as much
as 80 feet in the point at which the water, at ordinary high tide, touches the shore line."
Id. at 158, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
7. Plaintiff's Petition for Hearing at 1, 2, People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242
Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966). A petition for a rehearing was denied June
10, 1966, and respondent's petition for a hearing by the California Supreme Court was
denied July 6, 1966. Id. at 161, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
8. Id. at 158, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
9. Id.
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I. Tidal Datums and Tidal Boundaries
An understanding of the implications arising from the
district court decision requires some knowledge of the technical
concepts relating to tidal boundaries. First, the location of a
tidal boundary is dependent upon the fluctuations of the tides.",
Secondly, from observations of the tides, tidal datums, or mean
elevations of the tidal planes, such as mean high water or mean
low water, are computed." Following that, it must be determined
which of several tidal datums will be used. These tidal datums
must then be related to the slope of the beach. In more technical
terms:
Boundaries determined by the course of the tides involve
two engineering aspects: a vertical one, predicated on the
height reached by the tide during its vertical rise and fall, and
constituting a tidal plane or datum . . . ; and a horizontal
one, related to the line where the tidal plane intersects the
shore to form. the tidal boundary desired . . . The first is
derived from tidal observations alone, and, once derived
.... ,is for all practical purposes a permanent one. The
second is dependent on the first, but is also affected by the
natural processes of erosion and accretion, and the artificial
changes made by man.'2
As a starting point, it should be noted that the
characteristics of the tides are influenced by four factors:
1. The tide-producing forces of the sun and moon.
2. The bottom topography and configuration of the major
ocean basins.
3. The bottom topography and configuration of bays and
estuaries.
4. Meteorlogical phenomena."
The interaction of these four factors affects the frequency, the
range (the vertical difference between low water and the
preceding or following high water), and the height of the tides
throughout a fortnightly cycle." Furthermore, the range of the
10. See Tison, supra note 2, at 7.
11. Id.
12. I A. SHALOWITZ. SHORI AND SEA BOUNDARIIS 89 (Coast and Geodetic Survey
Pub. No. 10-I, 1962) (footnotes and illustrations omitted) [hereinafter cited as I
SHALOWITZ].




tide is affected by other astronomic factors which have a cycle of
18.6 years.' '5 "Thus to arrive at a reliable mean value for . ..
tidal datums, we need to observe the tide for almost 19 years."'"
The interaction of these variable factors also produces three
different types of tides in our oceans. Along the Atlantic Coast,
there are semidaily tides comprised of two practically equal low
waters and two practically equal high waters in each tidal day.
Along the Gulf Coast, the tides are mostly daily, with only one
low and one high water per day.17 Along the shores of the
Pacific, a mixed type of tide prevails. There are two highs and
two lows each day, but there exists a high degree of inequality
between successive highs and successive lows. Thus, on any one
tidal day,"s four different levels are reached by the tides, called
lower low water, low water, high water, and higher high water.
All of these factors must be taken into consideration to
understand how the tides are caused, and more importantly, to
understand how the tides are used to determine a boundary line.
The next step is to compute the tidal datum. For the
purposes of boundary demarcation, four tidal datums are
available. Two of these, mean low water and mean high water,
have received almost universal acceptance because they are
incidental to all three types of tides. One authority defines them
as follows:
The mean high water at any place is the elevation of the
mean level of high water determined, either directly or
indirectly, by averaging the height of all the high waters at
that place over a period of 19 years. Similarly the mean low
water at any place is the mean level of low water determined,
directly or indirectly, by averaging the heights of all the low
waters at that place over a period of 19 years.Y5
Along the Pacific Coast, because of the mixed type of tide
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. The most thorough and up to date source on this subject is the two volume
work by Shalowitz referred to in notes 2 and 12 supra. The Tison article, supra note 2. is
based in part upon that work, but is in a shorter form.
17. There are variations to this, however. At times, there are two of each, very much
unequal. This has caused considerable difficulty in the establishment of tidal datums and
boundaries. For a more detailed discussion, see Tison, supra note 2, at 9-10.
18. A tidal day is approximately 24 hours and 50 minutes long. 'This corresponds to
the daily retardation in the time of the moon's meridian passage. 2 SHALOWITZ 669.
19. Tison, supra note, 2, at 9. The author's reference to 19 years is actually a
19691
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which occurs there, and to some extent along the Gulf Coast
also,.two other datums are computed. These are mean lower low
water and mean higher high water. In conjunction with the mean
high and mean low water, these additional tabulations provide a
mean value for every tide that occurs along these shores.
The primary responsibility for the determination of these
values falls upon the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.' "
The Coast and Geodetic Survey makes tidal observations and the
computations necessary to establish tidal datums, and erects
bench marks from which elevations above and below sea level
can be measured.2' These observations and computations are also
published separately in loose-leaf form so that datums for any
particular area of the coast can be extrapolated.2
For general purposes the most important datum is mean sea
level, defined as the "elevation of the mean level of the sea at
any place determined . ..by averaging the heights of all stages
of the tide over a long period (usually 19 years)." 2'3 It is the most
important because it is "used for referencing elevations of bench
marks in the network of precise levels established by the Coast
Survey throughout the United States and Alaska, it being the
most practicable and the most stable datum for general
engineering use." '24 After the tidal datum to be used in
determining the boundary has been selected, the computations
are extracted from the published manuals, and referenced to the
bench marks erected as evidence of mean sea level. This method
provides an accurate and authoritative boundary accepted in
courts of law.25
reference to the 18.6 years considered to be the full tidal cycle. Shalowitz explains why
this period was chosen:
A period of 19 years is generally reckoned as constituting a full tidal cycle
because the more important of the periodic tidal variations due to astronomic
causes will have gone through complete cycles, and because the variations of
a nonperiodic character resulting from meteorological causes may be
assumed to balance out during this epoch.
I SHALOwITZ 89 n.16.
Tison's statement that the height of all the high waters is used is the correct federal
rule. But this is not universally accepted, as will be discussed injra.
20. See Karo, supra note I, at 27.
21. 2 SHALOWITZ 60-61, 72.
22. Id. at 72, 74.
23. Tison, supra note 2, at 9.
24. I SHALOWITZ 88.
25. See Karo, supra note I, at 28.
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The question now arises, which tidal datum should be
selected as the vertical component? The answer to this question
has most often been based on sheer practicality due to the great
divergence in the nature of the beaches and submerged lands
surrounding our oceans. The selection of one tidal datum rather
than another will have the effect of determining ownership of the
tidelands. Since the real difference between the tidal datums is
the height of the plane of water, that difference determines where
that plane will intersect the beach. (See Fig. 1.)
Initially, it may be well to point out that the principles of
tideland ownership and tidal boundaries are closely related, since
the definition of the former results in the delineation of the
latter. These principles have their source in the English common
law of the Seventeenth Century. From that time on, "it has been
considered as settled law in England that the title and the
dominion of the sea, and of the rivers and arms of the sea, where
the tide ebbs and flows, and of all lands below high-water mark,
are in the King." ' 2 The logic underlying this principle is that:
[s]uch waters, and the lands which they cover . . . are
incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivations,
and improvement. Hence the title . . . in such lands, belonged
to the King as the sovereign, but was held by him as the
representative of the people and was subject to the public
right . . . of navigation and fishing. This includes the
"shore," which according to the English courts is confined to
the "'flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides.":
This principle has been followed by most American
jurisdictions. Except where private grants were involved prior to
independence, the tidelands "became vested in the original states
and in the State of Texas as to land within the confines of their
respective boundaries, and in the United States as to that within
the boundaries of its public land territory.'"" Furthermore,
it is the general rule that a conveyance . . . of land traversed
by or bordering upon a water whose bed is not expressly
included or excluded does nevertheless . . . [exclude] it when
the water is navigable. In spite of rather numerous exceptions,
the foregoing is the rule in enough jurisdictions that it may
well be termed the general presumption.29
26. I SHALOWITZ 90.
27. Id. at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
28. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes
omitted).
29. Id. at § 12.27.
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When new states joined the Union, they succeeded to the
ownership previously held by the federal government, or the
previous sovereign, in the case of Texas."'
In California, tideland ownership is codified in section 670
of the California Civil Code. "The State is the owner of all land
below tide water, and below ordinary high-water mark, bordering
upon tide water within the State .... -31
The federal government has confirmed the principle of state
ownership of the tidelands by the enactment of the Submerged
Lands Act.2 Section 1311 confirms and establishes "title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters . . . to the
respective States . ..." Section 1301 defines lands beneath
navigable waters as "(2) all lands permanently or periodically
covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line of mean
high tide .... "
The nature and extent of the ownership of the tidelands by
the states has been summarized as a public trust, and may be
devoted to any use not inconsistent with that trust 3  "Its
ownership is subject to the public rights of navigation and fishing
as well as to the paramount powers of congress over commerce
. . . [and] navigation.'"3  Additionally, it is subject to the rights
of the upland owner. These include:
(1) the right of access.to the water, (2) the right to wharf out
to the line of navigability, (3) the right to accretions and
relictions, (4) the right to the natural flow of the water past
their land, and (5) the right to make a reasonable use of the
water.*
But these rights are "subject to being terminated at will by any
disposition which the state may choose to make . . ' "1 and
"although the sovereignty of the state over tidelands does not
deprive the littoral owner of his right of access . . . to the ocean
as against a stranger, 'this right is not given to the owner .. as
30. Id. at § 12.27(b).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 670 (West 1954).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1964).
33. People v. Hecker, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 346 (1960).
34. 45 C.J. Navigable Waters § 212 (1928) (footnotes omitted).
35. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.32 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes
omitted).
36. Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 792 (19,14).
[Vol. 6
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against the state or its grantee in the exercise of a lawful use or
purpose.' ,:17
If the tidelands are confined to lands covered by the "flux
and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides," they are necessarily
bounded by the limits reached by the ordinary high tides at the
landward extreme and the ordinary low tides at the seaward
extreme. Acceptance of the common law principle of tideland
ownership therefore carries with it as a necessary corollary the
acceptance of the ordinary high-water mark as the tidal datum
marking the boundary between upland and tideland.
A sufficient number of American jurisdictions have accepted
the common law principles of tideland ownership so that it can
be stated as a general rule that land which is owned by the state
is bounded by the ordinary high-water mark;:1 necessarily, then,
so is the land of the upland owner. But, "in the case of a few
Mexican grants it has been necessary to recognize that by the
civil law the line was fixed at the line marked by the highest
tide.' "
In contrast, a significant number of coastal states have
adopted the use of other tidal datums as their criteria. Along the
shores of the Pacific, California, Oregon and Washington have
accepted the mean high-water datum, while Alaska uses the
mean low-water datum" Along the Atlantic Coast, eight states
have chosen mean high water and seven mean low water' In the
Gulf Coast states, several different datums have been used, mean
high water, lower high water, and higher high water!2
While the principle of sovereign ownership of the tidelands
has been commonly accepted, a definition of "ordinary tides"
has not had common acceptance, but rather has been subject to
continuous disagreement. An English source declared:
In legal documents the lit tus nmaris is defined as "that ground
between the ordinary high-water and low-water mark".
37. People v. Hecker, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 345-46 (1960), citing Boone v. Kinsbury,
206 Cal. 148, 170, 273 P. 797, 807 (1928).
38. 3 AMIERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.27 at 250 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)
(footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at § 12.28.
40. See Tison, supra note 2, at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at II.
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Otherwise stated, the shore "is confined to the flux and reflux
of the sea at ordinary tides". The ambiguity of the above
definitions has been the cause of endless litigation. It is
obvious that the term "ordinary tides" is capable of several
definitions. The highest equinoctial spring tides occur in the
natural order of things, and are in this sense "ordinary'" 43
It is apparent from the English authorities quoted above
that the primary consideration was to make the most practical
and efficient use of the land. The only land considered capable of
being used was the land above the line of the ordinary tides.
Therefore, a determination of the meaning of that term became
necessary.
As used by the English courts, "ordinary tides" is not a
tidal datum, but rather a legal conclusion. It is one thing to
observe the tides, but a different thing to determine which of the
tides observed are ordinary. 4 As was discussed earlier, due to the
various factors which influence the tides, the frequency, range,
and height of the tides vary from day to day, month to month,
and year to year. Twice a month, when the astronomic forces are
working in conjunction with each other, the maximum range, or
spring tides occur;45 the high tide is higher than the average, and
the low tide is lower. On the other hand, twice a month the
minimum range, or neap tides, occur, because the astronomic
forces are working in opposition to each other;4 the high tide is
lower than the average, and the low tide is higher.47 The point of
this discussion is to indicate the difficulty in determining what
tides are ordinary. On the one hand, the spring and neap tides
are ordinary in that they occur regularly each month or each
year. Yet they are not ordinary in the sense that they are the
extremes in height, and do not occur as often as the tides in
between.
The determination of what constitutes ordinary tides in
43. A.E. CAREY & F.W. OLIVER, TIDAL LANDS A STUDY O SHORE PROBLLAIS 26
(1918).
44. In this regard, "ordinary" is distinct from "'mean", in that the latter refers to a
mathematical average. The former is a nontechnical term to describe tides which occur in
the regular course of a tidal period.
45. See Tison, supra note 2, at 7-8.
46. Id. at 7.
47. See 2 SH-ALOWITZ 669. "The neap range is usually about 20 percent less than
the mean range, and the spring range about 20 percent greater than the mean range."
[Vol. 6
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England was made in A ttorney- General v. Chambers."' There the
court stated:
The same reason that excludes the highest tides of the month
(which happen at the springs) excludes the lowest high tides
(which happen at the neaps), for the highest or spring tides
and the lowest high tides (those at the neaps) happen as often
as each other. The medium tides therefore of each quarter of
the tidal period afford a criterion which we think may be best
adopted.4 9
The result of this decision was a recognition of sovereign
ownership of the lands covered and uncovered by the ordinary
flux of the tides. By eliminating both the extraordinary highs and
the lowest highs, the boundary between upland and tideland was
to be "the line of the medium high tide between the springs and
the neaps,"' or the ordinary high-water mark.
This approach differs significantly from that of the civil law.
The civil law accepts as the boundary "the extreme limit to
which the highest natural tides extend . . ."I' but in
determining that limit, does not include "the highest actual tides,
for these may be produced by peculiarities of wind or other
temporary or accidental circumstances .... "1"
The American courts were also faced with the decision as to
what constitutes "ordinary tides." However, not all courts have
agreed upon a common definition. In Borax Consolidated, Ltd.
v. Los Angeles- :' the Supreme Court of the United States set
forth its interpretation of which tides were to be included in the
definition of "ordinary tides." Faced with a boundary dispute
48. 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (Ch. 1854).
49. Id. at 489. Shalowitz explains this decision as follows:
The Court, therefore, defined the "ordinary tides" . . . as the medium high
tides between the springs and the neaps. If spring tides alone were used, a
strip of shore to seaward of the spring limit would be covered only twice
during the month; the rest of the month it would be uncovered. Conversely, if
neap tides alone were used, a strip of shore to landward of the neap limit
would be uncovered only twice during the month; the rest of the month it
would be covered. Neither one would therefore express any concept of being
covered by ordinary tides.
I SHALOWITZ 92 n.25.
50. 43 Eng. Rep. at 490 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 489.
52. Id.
53. 296 U.S. 10 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Borax]. This case was recently reviewed
and confirmed in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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between an upland owner-grantee who had received his land
under a federal patent, and a tideland owner-grantee who had
received his grant from the state, the Court first held that the
extent of the federal grant was a federal question and amenable
to federal law. The Court recognized that federal law has
adopted the common law standard that the boundary is the
ordinary high-water mark. The significance of this decision was
that it interpreted "ordinary high water" as "mean high
water," 5 and thereby established a standard by which to judge
what is "ordinary." After reviewing the reasoning of the English
court in Chambers supra, Chief Justice Hughes concluded:
[W]e perceive no justification for taking neap high tides,
or the mean of those tides, as the boundary between upland
and tideland, and for thus excluding from the shore the land
which is actually covered by the tides most of the time. In
order to include the land that is thus covered, it is necessary
to take the mean high tide line which .. .is neither the
spring tide nor the neap tide, but a mean of all the high
tides.-
Thus, in announcing the federal rule, the Court relied to some
extent upon the definition of mean high tide given by the Coast
and Geodetic Survey, which uses the mean of all the-high tides."
It would seem that this is the most practical formula, since the
Survey computations and publications include all the high tides,
and those figures are the ones relied on by surveyors. 7
Furthermore, aside from eliminating complexities, it would
appear that the result of the application of the federal formula
would not differ significantly from that reached under the
English rule, since those tides eliminated by the latter do not
occur as often as those used, and probably balance each other
mathematically.,
In its attempt to define the "ordinary tides," California has
reached a different result, although it is not entirely clear what
was intended by the divergence." Section 830 of the Civil Code
54. See Tison, supra note 2, at 10. For the federal courts, at least, this ambiguous
legal term was given a technically precise definition.
55. 296 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 26-27.
57. See Karo, supra note 1, at 28.
58. The elimination of a few figures, some lower and some higher, than an
average figure would probably not change that average significantly if they were included.
59. California has not followed the lead of the federal courts which have interpreted
the term 'ordinary" as "'mean". See notes 44 and 54 supra.
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provides: "Except where the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it
borders on tidewater, takes to ordinary high-water mark
... ,,'0 The first case involving a judicial interpretation of the
term was Tesehemacher v. Thompson,6" and it is the language of
this case upon which the California rule is based.
The limit of the monthly Spring tides is, in one sense, the
usual high water mark; -for, as often as those tides occur, to
that limit the flow extends. But it is not the limit to which we
refer when we speak of "usual" or "ordinary" high water
mark. By that designation we mean the limit reached by the
neap tides; that is, those tides which happen between the full
and change of the moon, twice in every twenty-four hours. 2
By thus restricting "ordinary" tides to the neap tides, and
excluding the monthly spring tides, it would appear that the
court did not intend for all the tides to be included. If that was
the case, then truly the California rule is different from the
federal rule. But it is not really clear what the court meant to
include when it used the term "neap," and on this basis the
decision has been criticized. Shalowitz states that the decision is
. . . scientifically inaccurate in its reference to spring and
neap tides. The court refers to "monthly spring tides," when
spring tides occur twice a month at the full and change of the
moon; and it uses the word "neap," not in its accepted
technical sense as those tides which occur twice a month when
the moon is in its first and third quarters, but in some
ambiguous sense to designate a plurality of tides between full
and change. . . . The court apparently thought . . . that all
tides are either spring or neap; that the springs occur but once
a month; and that all other tides are neap tides and differ but
little among themselves, making them the "usual" or
"ordinary" tides.'
As the criticism points out, the Teschemacher decision could
stand for either one of two propositions. First, the "ordinary
tides" include only those neap tides which occur twice a month
when the moon is in its first and third quarters; second, the
"ordinary tides" include all of the tides, inaccurately called
60. CAL. CIv. CoDri § 830 (West 1954).
61. 18 Cal. 11 (1861).
62. Id. at 21.
63. I SHALOWITZ 93.
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"neaps," which occur between full and change of the moon,
except for the spring tides.
In Ward v. MulJbrd,14 the court seems to have adopted the
second interpretation. Citing Teschemacher, the court spoke of
"the neap or ordinary tides, which occur twice every twenty-four
hours. 15 Similarly, in Eichelberger v. Mills Land and Water
CompanyY," the court again cited Tesehemacher in fixing a
boundary at the high-water mark at ordinary or neap tides.', The
same result was reached in a number of other subsequent cases.,'
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude from a fair
reading of the Teschemacher decision and the interpretation
given it by subsequent cases that the court meant the true
California rule to include all tides except the monthly spring
tides in determining what the "ordinary tides" are, and
furthermore, that the use of the word "neap" was not intended
in its restrictive technical sense as the twice a month tides during
the first and third quarters of the moon. Indeed, until the district
court decision in Kent, it does not appear that any appellate
court decision in California has adopted that restrictive
interpretation.
Before moving on to a discussion of that aspect of the Kent
case, a review of the various attempts to define "ordinary"
(discussed above) may be helpful. The English rule as established
by Chambers excludes both the springs and the neaps (in the
technical sense); all other tides are ordinary. The federal rule as
enunciated by the Borax case used all of the tides, including the
springs and the neaps. The California rule, based on
Teschemacher, included all tides except the springs, using the
word "neap" to mean "ordinary."
This background material is helpful in analyzing the district
court decision in Kent. The court was correct in pointing out
that the trial court had mistakenly applied the federal rule rather
64. 32 Cal. 365 (1867).
65. Id. at 370.
66. 9 Cal. App. 628, 100 P. 117 (1908).
67. Id. at 640.
68. Otey v. Carmel Sanitary District, 219 Cal. 310, 26 P.2d 308 (1933); City of
Oakland v. E.K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 292 P. 1076 (1930): FA. Hihn Co. v.
City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 150 P. 62 (1915); Bolsa Land Co. v. Vaqueros Major
Oil Company, Ltd., 25 Cal. App. 2d 75, 76 P.2d 519 (1938); J.W. Forgeus v. County of
Santa Cruz, 24 Cal. App. 193, 140 P. 1092 (1914).
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than the California rule in defining ordinary tides. But in
restating the California rule, the court said that only "the
average of all high neap tides" 19 were to be used, and defined
neap tides as "those occurring when the moon is in its first and
third quarters . . . ,,70 thus adopting the technical definition of
neap tides. There is no doubt that that is the correct technical
definition of neap tides. But in so construing the California rule,
the court clearly was in error. The authority cited by the court
was to the line of cases beginning with Teschemacher and
discussed above.7' There is no basis for the belief by the court
that those cases support the view it took in Kent.
Assuming for the purposes of discussion that the Kent
decision was an inaccurate statement of the California rule
correctly stated by Teschenmacher, the questions arise, is there
any legitimate reason for maintaining a rule distinct from the
federal rule? Is there a valid difference, or are there any
significant consequences? As was mentioned in connection with
the Borax case above, the Coast and Geodetic Survey definition
of mean high tide includes the average height of all the high
waters;72 thus all the tides are used when computing the height of
ordinary high water. These computations in their published form
lend themselves to easy reference when attempting to ascertain
the vertical component requisite to boundary determinations.
Under the California rule, however, the ordinary high water
datum must be recomputed, excluding the monthly spring tides.
Thus, it would appear that the federal rule is much easier to
apply, since the data is readily available. Furthermore, from a
mathematical standpoint, the addition of the tidal measurements
that would result from the inclusion of the monthly spring tides
would not significantly change the average of the other tides. The
ultimate tidal datum would, for all intent and purposes, be the
same. It is suggested, therefore, that California could adopt the
federal rule and achieve uniformity without significantly
changing present boundary lines.3
69. 242 Cal. App. 2d at 161, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
70. Id.
7 1. See cases cited notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
72. Marmer, Tidal Datum Planes, COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY SPECIAL PUBLI-
CATION No. 135, 76 (1951).
73. It appears that, either by error or design, the Second District Court of Appeals
has already moved in that direction. In Swarzwald v. Cooley, 39 Cal. App. 2d 306, 103
P.2d 580 (1940), the court used the average of all the high tides to determine the plane of
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II. The Fluctuating Shoreline
The boundary problem in Kent, however, involved much
more than a misapplication of the California rule concerning the
computation of ordinary or mean high water. This determination
provides just one of the two necessary engineering components.
The second, or horizontal, component consists of a horizontal
line drawn from the elevation of the first component, the tidal
datum, to a position of intersection with the beach (see Fig. 1).
This point of intersection is the tidal boundary. Obviously, this
horizontal component is dependent upon the establishment of the
vertical component; it will not change unless the height of the
tidal datum itself changes, and, as has already been discussed,
for all practical purposes the tidal datum does not change except
over a long period of years. Consequently, the ho'rizontal
component does not change either. But, the point where that line
strikes the beach can change, due to the movement of the beach
itself. In that event, the location of the tidal boundary is
dependent upon the reasons for and characterizations of that
movement.
The trial court in Kent characterized the fluctuations of the
beach as natural erosion and accretion. The district court found
error in that characterization upon the following basis:
[A]ddition to the land is accretion (and loss of land is
deliction), only when the changes are gradual and
imperceptible . . . . or "by little and little, by small and
imperceptible degrees" . . . . The evidence here is that the
beach is some 80 feet wider in summer than in winter. If these
changes be constant, in offsetting pairs occurring annually,
they can hardly be gradual and imperceptible, and thus
cannot meet the definitions of natural accretion and
deliction
The crucial aspect of this argument is the hypothesis that a
continuous but self-neutralizing fluctuation is neither gradual nor
imperceptible and therefore neither accretion nor deliction; or,
put another way, that it is neither accretion nor deliction because
it is neither gradual nor imperceptible. Yet, as a practical
ordinary high water. Id. at 313, citing H.A. Marmer, supra note 72. There is no evidence
from the case that a federal patent was involved, nor any evidence that the court thought
the case called for the application of the federal rule. It appears that the court was trying
to apply state law, and adopted the use of the federal position for that purpose.
74. 242 Cal. App. 2d at 160, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19 (citations omitted).
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matter, the movement of the beach would not have been visible
to an observor, except over a period of days. 75 Furthermore, the
fact that the movement was "constant" and in "offsetting
pairs" should have no bearing upon whether the movement was
"gradual" and "imperceptible." There is no logic which
compels that conclusion.
Shalowitz defines accretion as "[tlhe gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of land by natural causes ....
This may result from a deposit of alluvion upon the shore, or by
a recession of the water from the shore. Accretion is the act,
while alluvion is the deposit itself.' 76 Erosion is "the gradual
and imperceptible washing away of the land along the sea by
natural causes." 7 7 Avulsion is defined as "the loss of lands
bordering on the seashore by sudden or violent action of the
elements, perceptible while in progress. '7 7 As a general rule,
when the shoreline is shifted suddenly or by artificial means, the
boundary lines remain as they were before the shift. When the
change occurs gradually by erosion, accretion, or reliction, the
boundary lines shift with the shore.7 The theory underlying these
rules is that "[w]hen the land conveyed is bounded by water, it
may well be regarded as the expectancy of both grantor and
grantee that it should continue to be so bounded." ''
Furthermore, "[n]atural justice requires that such accretions
should belong to the upland owner so that he will not be shut off
from the water."" Blackstone laid down the common law rule,
and part of the rationale, in the following passage:
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion
or by dereliction ...the law is held to be, that if the gain be
by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall
go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimus non
curat lex; and, besides, these owners being often losers by the
breaking in of the sea, . . .this possible gain is therefore a
reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss. But,
75. At the rate of 80 feet every six months, the actual change per day would amount
to only 5.26 inches, if the change were uniform.
76. I SH-ALOWITZ 279.
77. Id. at 288.
78. Id. at 281.
79. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.113, at 434-35 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)
(footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at § 15.27, at 857.
81. Id. at § 15.27, at 858-59 (footnotes omitted).
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if the alluvion . . . be sudden and considerable, in this case it
belongs to the king: for, as . . . owner of the soil while it is
covered with water, it is but reasonable he should have the
soil, when the water has left it dry. 2
What would seem to be controlling, then, is the issue of
time; over how long a period of time must the change be
"gradual and imperceptible" in order to be classed as an
accretion rather than an avulsion? The common law test of that
time element was laid down in County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston,"I when the Supreme Court said: "The test as to
what is gradual and imperceptible . . . is, that though the
witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been
made, they could not perceive it while the process was going
on." ' S4 In Jejferis v. East Omaha Land C'o., 8 3 the Court
confirmed that principle and added its view that by English law
additions formed "so slowly that its progress cannot be
perceived" 6 were classed as accretions. On the other hand, the
California case of Bohn v. Albertson17 set forth as the test of an
avulsion "[a] sudden or violent action of the elements,
perceptible while in progress.'' s
Based on these definitions and tests, it is difficult to see how
the beach movement in Kent could technically be classified as
anything but accretions and erosions, notwithstanding the
continuity and predictability" of the fluctuations. As a result of
82. 2 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THIu LAWS OF ENGLAND 261-62 (1766).
This has had wide acceptance in this country. See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90
U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); Dana v. The Jackson Street Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 118 (1866).
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1014 (West 1954). provides that "'[where, from natural causes.
land forms by imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not
navigable, either by accumulation of material or by recession of the stream, such land
belongs to the owner of the bank ....
The California Supreme Court subsequently declared that this section was not meant
to abrogate the common law in regard to accretions upon the seashore, and recognized
title to such accretions in the upland owner. Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long
Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 7'72-73, 161 P. 975, 978 (1916); .see also Carpenter v. City of Santa
Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 147 P.2d 964 (1944).
83. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
84. Id. at 68.
85. 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
86. Id. at 193.
87. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951).
88. Id. at 748, 238 P.2d at 135, citing Schwartzstein v. B.B. Bathing Park, 203 App.
Div. 700, 197 N.Y.S. 490, 492 (1922).
89. As a matter of fact, the district court was not convinced by the evidence that the
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that determination, it would necessarily follow that, as the beach
or shoreline fluctuates, so too does the borderline marking
ownership.
But a decision to the effect that the seasonal fluctuations of
the beach were by accretion and erosion would not necessarily
solve all the problems presented in this controversy. True, the
boundary line between upland and tideland would be marked by
the point of intersection of the horizontal line of ordinary high
water with the beach, described as the ordinary high-water mark.
But that mark would fluctuate seaward and landward as the
beach itself moved. Thus, ownership of that eighty foot strip of
land would change correspondingly; in the winter, the state
would own it, and in the summer the company would own it.
The parties would never be able to make permanent use of any
portion of that strip, because at some time during the year, the
adverse party would own it. This would preclude the erection of
any kind of permanent structure on the strip. And if oil or other
mineral deposits should be discovered there, it is difficult to say
who would have the mineral rights. Presumably, one of the
parties could drill for oil for part of the year, but when the
ordinary high-water mark passed him by, he would have to
relinquish his rights to the other party, who would then have the
ownership of the land. If there are any policy reasons in favor of
permanence of boundaries, allowing adjoining landowners full
knowledge of the extent of their ownership, a finding of accretion
and erosion as in this case would surely create a conflict.
Aside from that conclusion, it is interesting to note an
inconsistency in the reasoning of the district court. On the one
hand, the court ruled that no accretion had occurred, and
therefore that the upland owner could not claim ownership to
that portion of the beach which was in existence in the summer
but not in winter, a strip of land varying in width up to eighty
feet. On the other hand, in its attempt to fix a boundary, the
court was called upon to suggest some means by which to
ascertain where the horizontal component intersected the beach.
The answer given was to compute the average line of the shore
extent of the movement was predictable. It was acknowledged that the fluctuations
occurred annually, but whether or not the fluctuations amounted to eighty feet every year
was left to be decided upon retrial.
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by taking into consideration the seasonal movements of the sand.
Presumably, if the computation is possible (and there is strong
doubt that it is, as will be discussed infra), this average line of the
shore will lie somewhere between the two extreme limits of this
eighty foot strip. Therefore, the upland owner will acquire
ownership of that portion of the beach between the average line
and the extreme landward limit of the eighty foot strip,
ownership which was denied him by the non-application of the
laws of accretion. What the court took away with one hand is
given back with the other, to the extent of approximately one
half.
Having rejected the accretion-erosion concept as a method
of determining the location of the boundary, the court proposed
a novel means to resolve the issue. The court directed the parties
to attempt to determine the average line of the shore against
which the ordinary high-water datum could be appliedyu This
would create a fictional but stable shoreline, which would at least
create a fixed boundary and thus avoid the impracticability of
constantly changing ownership of the fluctuating strip of sand.
But this solution is open to criticism on several grounds.
The most immediate objection is the difficulty in
determining that average. There are no published figures which
detail the extent and amount of beach erosion and accretion. If
there were maps available that showed the position of the
shoreline at regular intervals during the year for a significant
number of years, it would be possible to make a comparison
between them to ascertain the extent of the movement as well as
the frequency and duration. In a declaration prepared by the
State Lands Commission,"' the executive officer declared that the
"average line of the shore" concept is dependent upon adequate
records to analyze the history of the shoreline." He states that an
insufficient number of maps are available, and those that are
available are derived from different sources, which inhibits their
use for the purposes of comparison. They show generally the
position of the shore at various yearly intervals, while what is
needed here is a series of maps on a monthly or perhaps even
weekly basis, for a long period.
90. 242 Cal. App. 2d at 161, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
91. Plaintiff's Petition for Hearing, Appendix II, People v. William Kent Estate
Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966).
92. Id. at I.
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The only possible method, then, to obtain this average is to
observe and record the beach movements periodically throughout
the year, and on a yearly basis. The time and expense involved
are virtually insurmountable barriers, precluding any practical
application of this method as a solution to the problem. It is
doubtful that an average line of the shore could ever be
determined; lacking that, no boundary could ever be fixed, since
there is no stable point where the horizontal component will
strike the beach.
However, assuming that this average shoreline could be
determined, the boundary thus resulting is still subject to
criticism. Since the boundary would be stable, and located
somewhere in the middle of the eighty foot strip, for that portion
of the year that the line of actual high tide (the line where the
then-existing plane of ordinary high-water intersects the beach) is
seaward of the boundary line, the upland owner is deprived of his
littoral rights to the sea. That portion of the beach would,
practically-speaking, be upland; it is not tideland by the common
law and long-accepted definition in this country because not
covered by the ordinary flux and reflux of the sea, and is
landward of the then-existing ordinary high-water mark. By the
same token, for that portion of the year when the then-existing
ordinary high-water mark is landward of the boundary, the
upland owner's property is covered by the flux and reflux of the
sea, and is, practically-speaking, tidelands which the state does
not own.
For all these reasons, but primarily due to the impossibility
of ascertaining the average line of the shore, the solution
proposed by the district court is unsatisfactory. Other solutions
are available should the court decide to reject the ordinary high-
water mark as the method of determining boundary lines in cases
of this typeY3 One such proposal would be to grant joint
ownership of the strip to both the upland owner and the state.
But this solution would nevertheless be a restriction upon each of
the joint owners, and the use to which they could put their land.
Such a restriction is inconsistent with the desire of the upland
owner to make exclusive use of the land for his own purposes,
which purposes, in all likelihood, conflict directly with the nature
93. However, since the ordinary high-water mark is a statutory declaration (see note
60 szipra), the legislature is the proper authority to make this decision.
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of the interest held by the state. It must be recognized that, at
least, on the surface, the state is suing here to protect the rights
of the public to free use and passage over and along the
tidelands. This restriction would affect that interest as
significantly as that of the upland owner. For the same reasons,
the granting of easements across the strip of beach would also be
less than satisfactory.
If the concept of the ordinary high-water mark as
determinative of tidal boundaries is retained, there are two other
possibilities not considered by the district court, both of which
will establish a stable and readily ascertainable boundary without
hindering the full enjoyment of the land. The first possibility is
to adopt as the boundary the ordinary high-water mark as it
exists when erosion has had its maximum effect, when that mark
is at its extreme landward migration. It would be characterized
by permanence and stability, and would be readily ascertainable.
Both the state and the upland owner would know the exact
nature and extent of their ownerships, and could make full use of
their land. In effect, it would give ownership of the entire eighty
foot strip to the state. The most glaring difficulty with this
solution, however, is that for most of the year the upland owner
is not a littoral owner. The water would be in contact with his
land for only a short period of time when erosion is at its
maximum and accretion is about to begin. This could seriously
jeopardize the use and value of the remainder of the land. The
other solution is the opposite extreme; adopt as the boundary the
ordinary high-water mark as it exists when accretion is at its
maximum. This solution provides a readily ascertainable
boundary with the same stability and permanence as in the prior
proposal. The result would be to recognize ownership of the
eighty foot strip in the upland owner. Additionally, the littoral
rights of the upland would be completely protected, since the
water would always be in contact with some part of the land.
III. Conclusion
Which one of these solutions would best suit the needs of
the law would depend upon which one of two public policies is
deemed the most important by the legislature or the judiciary.
Balanced against the public policy favoring private ownership
(including littoral rights) of land is the public trust in the
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tidelands held by the state incident to its ownership. A
determination of which one of these policies is most important
will point the direction to either one of the two proposed
solutions.
The Kent decision, and the facts giving rise to the
controversy, illustrate the problems that can result when trying
to determine the location of a tidal boundary. Although the
selection of a particular tidal datum to use as the vertical
component does not present any great difficulty, problems do
arise when trying to determine which of the monthly tides are to
be used in computing that datum. The uniform acceptance of the
federal standard would eliminate this confusion. Furthermore,
although the beach movement in Kent may have been extreme,
the situation serves to illustrate that the acceptance of a uniform
standard for the ordinary high-water mark will not by itself
eliminate tidal boundary questions."
Peter K. Nunez
94. Since the district court remanded for a new trial, the courts are still faced with
these problems, it will be interesting to see how the problems are ultimately resolved.
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